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Abstract
Research in the behavioral psychology of voting has found that voters tend to be poorly informed,
highly responsive to candidate personality, and follow a \fast and frugal" heuristic. This paper
analyzes optimal candidate strategies in a two-party election in which voters are assumed to
behave according to these traits. Under this assumption, candidates face a trade-o between
appealing to a broader base and being overly ambiguous in their policy stances. A decrease in
the cost of ambiguity within this model oers a parsimonious justication for the increase in
voter independence, candidate ambiguity, and party politics that empirical studies have revealed
over the last ve decades. I additionally argue a decrease in the cost of ambiguity is a natural
result of the primary system, campaign nance reform, and changing media environment.
This paper analyzes the outcome of a two-party election in which voters utilize a voting heuristic
based on the ndings of behavioral psychologists. My proposed voting behavior is similar in nature
to Aragones and Postlewaite (2002), in which voters have an \intensity of preferences" such that
a voter displays risk-loving behavior when his ideal issue point is oered as part of a campaign
platform. This desire to hear a particular issue stance introduces a role for ambiguity I incorporate
within my model. This paper relaxes the assumptions of rationality and instead models voters
behaviorally according to a decision process based on the ndings of Lau and Redlawsk (2006).1
Each voter is assumed to have extreme intensity concerning his ideal issue point, requiring a can-
didate to oer his ideal issue, even if the candidate is highly ambiguous in his campaign platform.
If both candidates oer the ideal issue, then the voter probabilistically makes his decision utilizing
a contest success function based on the candidates' ambiguity levels and personality traits. This
tradeo between appealing to a broader base and appearing disingenuous is the core tension in the
model.
I present results relating three recent trends in American presidential politics to a single parameter
in the model. In particular, as ambiguity becomes less costly for a candidate, the model predicts an
increase in the number of independent voters, an increase in the equilibrium level of candidate am-
biguity, and an increase in the partisanship of political parties. All three trends have been observed
in recent decades, and I argue that the primary system, campaign nance reform, and changing
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1It should be noted that I am agnostic concerning voter rationality. If the proposed decision process reduces
information search costs and mental conict, then use of such a heuristic can be consistent with rational optimizing
behavior.2 Rationality and the American Voter
media environment are consistent with this phenomenon.
Existing literature oers potential justications for each of these trends. Rabinowitz and Macdon-
ald (1989), for instance, predicts that candidates will become more partisan based on voters having
a preference for issue intensity as well as direction. Candidate ambiguity can be explained with
probabilistic voting models such as those detailed in Coughlin (1992). In a deterministic framework,
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) and Aragones and Neeman (2000) have shown that candidates will
choose to be ambiguous if they care about more than merely winning the election. Callander and
Wilson (2008) have shown that candidates will respond to context-dependent voters by giving am-
biguous policy stances. This paper aims to add to the literature by showing that all three political
trends can be explained simultaneously following a decrease in the cost of ambiguity. In addition,
I oer an explanation for the specic timing of these trends.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I oer evidence indicating that voters do not
systematically behave rationally. In particular, I discuss the use of mental heuristics and emotional
cues in the formation of voting decisions. In Section 2, I describe specic voting characteristics
determined by Lau and Redlawsk (2006) and posit a formal behavioral model designed to incorpo-
rate these ndings. In Section 3, I incorporate this model into a modied spatial game of campaign
strategy between two candidates. In Section 4, I solve for the optimal strategies of the candidates
and in Section 5, I show how these strategies can help explain recent trends in American presidential
elections. Section 6 oers a measurement of the ecacy of the proposed model and compares it to
the party heuristic. Section 7 discusses the multidimensional formulation of the game and Section
8 concludes.
1 Rationality and the American Voter
1.1 Heuristics
Considerable amounts of research by Converse (1964), Bennett (1996), Neuman (1986) and others
have shown that the American voter's political knowledge is, on average, extremely low. Baum
(2005), for instance, nds that according to the 2000 American National Election Study (ANES),
60% of respondents who indicated that they follow government and public aairs \hardly at all"
or \only now and then" claimed to have voted. In an aggregation of 2000 survey questions asked
over the last 50 years concerning questions one might expect an informed citizen to know, Carpini
and Keeter (1996) nd only 40% of the questions for which over half the population can answer
correctly.2 As a stylized example, Carpini (1999) cites a 1992 report by the Center for the Study
of Communication at the University of Massachusetts that found while 86% of a random sample of
likely voters knew the Bush family dog was named Millie and 89% knew that Murphy Brown was
the TV character criticized by Dan Quayle, only 15% knew that both candidates favored the death
penalty and only 5% knew that both had proposed cuts in the capital gains tax.
2Carpini (1999) notes that of the questions that cannot be answered by over half the population are \denitions
of key terms such as liberal, conservative, primary elections, or the bill of rights; knowledge of many individual and
collective rights guaranteed by the Constitution;...candidate and party stands on many important issues of the day;
key social conditions such as the unemployment rate or the percentage of the public living in poverty or without
health insurance; how much of the federal budget is spent on defense, foreign aid, or social welfare; and so on".Rationality and the American Voter 3
This trend indicates that voters might deviate from fully informed issue-based rational behavior.
One of the accepted tenants of behavioral psychology regarding deviations from rationality is that
individuals are systematically unable to perform exceedingly complex mental calculations. As such,
in \hard" choice environments, such as the comparison of ideological issues present in national elec-
tions, humans use \fast and frugal" mental heuristics. As demonstrated by Gigerenzer et al. (2000),
these heuristics allow individuals to make a choice with minimal information requirements that can
approach, or even exceed, the accuracy of modern computational techniques. Baron (1990), Hog-
arth (1987), and Payne et al. (1993) have all shown that when making a choice, individuals try
to avoid trade-os and instead focus on a single good reason to select an option. Despite being
seemingly uninformed, research has shown that citizens generally make reasonable policy decisions
when using heuristics. In a study of 45 policy issues, Althaus (1998) estimates that 80% of the
sampled collective preferences were identical to those made by a highly-informed populace.
To further illustrate the use of noncompensatory heuristics, a study published in the Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, Westen et al. (2004), performed MRI brain-imaging on \committed" Re-
publicans and Democrats. During the study, each subject was exposed to a series of slides that
demonstrated inconsistent statements made by his candidate of choice as well as the opposing can-
didate. When exposed to contradictory statements by his candidate, brain regions were activated
which were involved in implicit emotion regulation and the elicitation of negative emotion. These
areas were distinct from the areas of the brain involved in cold-reasoning and conscious emotion
regulation. In other words, when exposed to contrary information, brain regions linked to \rational
thought" were not used, preventing the information from entering the subject's decision calculus.
This is consistent with the use of heuristics, in which information received after a choice is made is
ignored or rationalized.
This nonrational treatment of information can also be seen in the American National Election
Studies data. Since 1976, all surveyed individuals who could correctly identify the Democratic can-
didate as weakly more liberal than the Republican candidate were asked to place each candidate on
a Liberal/Conservative scale of 1-7. Individuals who voted for a candidate placed that candidate
.05 closer to themselves than the average surveyed individual placed the candidate. More impor-
tantly, they placed the opposing candidate .91 points farther from themselves. This is in contract
to nonvoters, who placed the Democratic candidate .32 points farther from themselves and the
Republican candidate .28 points farther. As compared to nonvoters, voters appear to be processing
information dierently as predicted with the use of a fast and frugal heuristic.
1.2 Candidate Personality
Another deviation from fully informed issue-based rationality is the role of candidate personality
on voter aect. Aect is dened as the emotional \feeling" an individual develops toward a specic
choice. It is distinctly separate from rational intelligence, both conceptually and neurobiologically.
In the political realm, familiarity, perceived truthworthiness, overall image, enthusiasm, and other
\non-issue" traits have all been found to play an important role in voter behavior through their
manipulation of voter emotions. Kinder and Abelson (1981), Marcus et al. (2000), Rosenberg and
McCaerty (1987), and Rosenberg et al. (1986) all show that candidate image inuences voter
choice. In presidential elections, the eect is even more pronounced, with the ANES nding that4 A Dynamic Voting Heuristic
the candidate who rates higher in the public's \Average Feeling Thermometer"3 has not lost a
presidential election since the question was created in 1968. Miller et al. (1986) even nds that
voter perception of candidates relies more on personality than issue concerns. In addition, these
perceptions are not supercial, but reect performance-based criteria such as integrity and reliabil-
ity.
2 A Dynamic Voting Heuristic
In an eort to determine what heuristics voters use, Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk (Lau
and Redlawsk, 2006) created an extensive experimental environment that mimicked the dynamic
nature of presidential politics. In particular, individuals were faced with general information cues
(such as \Candidate A's Stand on Taxes/Tax Reform") that they could select to learn the specic
information contained within. As with a real election, spending the time to focus on a specic cue
meant possibly ignoring another piece of information. Through this process and extensive pre/post-
trial surveys, they were able to make conclusions as to how voters make their decisions. Among
other ndings, they determined:
Finding 1: In selecting the voter's preferred candidate, memory and aective perception both
play a role. In other words, specic information cues as well as overall perception are used
as a basis for choice. In selecting the voter's rejected candidate, however, aective memory
does not play a signicant role. The voter seemingly uses specic information to reject the
candidate, and does not retain an \overall feeling".
Finding 2: Voters recall more total information concerning their preferred candidate.
Finding 3: Of the information recalled, voters recall a higher percentage of positive information
for their preferred candidate.
In addition, the study was able to oer a metric for the number of voters using various decision
strategies. The authors found that approximately 25% of voters were using a party-heuristic and
15% of voters were using a rational decision strategy. Over 50% of voters were using a single-issue
or noncompensatory heuristic, which are analytically equivalent within the model utilized in this
paper.
2.1 \Hear What You Want To Hear" Voter Heuristic
I propose a voter heuristic inspired by Lau and Redlawsk's ndings. Like Downs, I assume each
voter has an ideal point at which they would like a candidate to locate.4 Unlike Downs, I assume
a voter uses the following heuristic in choosing his preferred candidate:
3Question VCF0201 in the Cumulative Data File. 1976 question text: \We'd also like to get your feelings about
some groups in American society. When I read the name of a group, we'd like you to rate it with what we call a
feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees-100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the
group; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorably toward the group and that you don't
care too much for that group."
4Alternatively, I could assume each voter has an interval for which he would consider a candidate acceptable. The
main results of the paper do not change.A Dynamic Voting Heuristic 5
1. A voter receives enough information to determine which candidates put positive probability
on his ideal issue point.
2. If neither candidate puts positive probability on the voter's ideal issue point, he does not vote.
3. If only one of the candidates puts positive probability on the voter's ideal issue point, he votes
for that candidate.
4. If both candidates put positive probability on the voter's ideal issue point, he votes for each
candidate as probabilistically determined by a function incorporating each candidate's ambi-
guity and personality characteristics.
Note that under this heuristic, the voter is displaying a form of lexicographic preferences over his
ideal issue point. Particularly, regardless of any other criteria, a candidate will be selected only
if his issue platform contains the voter's ideal point. This coincides with Luce et al. (2001), who
nd \the major form of emotion-focused coping relevant to decision processing is a desire to avoid
particularly distressing explicit tradeos between attributes. That is, if tradeo diculty is elicited
by the perception that valued goals must be given up, then the decision maker should try...to avoid
these sacrices altogether."
Also under this heuristic, if a candidate is rejected in Step 2, a particular issue stance will cause
the rejection. The voter will not make an emotional judgment, in that once the decision is reached,
no additional information is required. If both candidates continue to Step 3, we expect the voter
to make a more aective decision, in that non-issue related cues are helping to form the vote. Note
that memory will still play a role, as expected, since each candidate can only reach Step 3 if their
memory-related issue cues are in line with the voter. These predictions are consistent with Lau and
Redlawsk's Finding 1.
In addition, because this heuristic is noncompensatory, the voter will be expected to be exposed
to contradictory information after his decision is made. As such, we would expect internal justi-
cations to occur of the sort seen by Westen et al. (2004). In particular, \good" information will
be retained, while \bad" information will be justied or neglected. This coincides with Lau and
Redlawsk's Findings 2 and 3 which state that voters will recall more information concerning the
preferred candidate, and the information will be of a more positive nature.
It is important to note that while Step 1 might seem informationally intensive, it is in fact a fast and
frugal heuristic. Voters generally have a limited number of key issues on which they base their vote,
restricting the number of issues on which they need information. In addition, voters do not need
to analyze all policy positions by a candidate to determine if their ideal point is included. Instead,
they need only look at the policy stances the candidate has emphatically rejected to determine if
their ideal point is excluded. Given that the President's authority exists in his veto power, the
only unambiguous statements a candidate can make concerning potential laws involves bills he will
NOT enact. For instance, according to his website, John McCain's stance on abortion is:
John McCain believes Roe v. Wade is a awed decision that must be overturned, and as
president he will nominate judges who understand that courts should not be in the business of
legislating from the bench. Constitutional balance would be restored by the reversal of Roe v.
Wade, returning the abortion question to the individual states. The dicult issue of abortion
should not be decided by judicial at.6 Candidate Campaign Game
For pro-life voters, it is unclear whether he would support a federal ban on abortion, a federal ban
on third-trimester abortions, etc. For pro-choice voters, however, is is unambiguous that he would
support the overturn of Roe v. Wade, a critical issue.
It should be noted that this heuristic is essentially a formalization of the observation that \people
hear what they want to hear". It is also important to realize that this heuristic is not proposed
as a universal voting heuristic. It is specic to the environment of modern American presidential
elections in which \dicult" issues are addressed in a two-party environment. I will later show that
the proposed heuristic is ecologically rational5 in the American presidential election environment,
but this might not be the case in a dierent election format, or even in a dierent period in American
politics. Pre-1960, for instance, an even faster and more frugal heuristic of voting along party lines
proved highly accurate. I will later discuss some of the changes that have occurred since 1960 that
have led to the partial abandonment of the party heuristic.
3 Candidate Campaign Game
Having established the voter heuristic, I now turn to the actual game played by the candidates, D
and R. These politicians, only concerned with winning, compete with each other in an election. As
is common in spatial models, I assume a unidimensional issue space on the real line, <. As will be
discussed later, unidimensionality is not required under the assumption that ambiguity in one issue
does not relate to ambiguity in another. A uniformly distributed continuum of voters exists.
The sequence of the game is as follows.
1. Nature selects the most liberal possible position of the Democratic candidate,  DL.6 This
can be viewed as an indication of past candidate voting bias, the current ideology of the
Democratic party, or the natural checks-and-balances inherent in American politics. Simulta-
neously, nature selects the most conservative possible position of the Republican candidate,
 RC >  DL. Both values are known by all players.
2. The Democratic candidate selects her most conservative campaign position, DC 2 [  DL;  RC].
This will establish her level of campaign ambiguity, DC   DL. Simultaneously, the Republican
candidate selects his most liberal campaign position, RL. This will establish his level of
campaign ambiguity,  RC   RL. Note I explicitly assume a candidate's strategy is a convex
interval. This avoids dubious campaign strategies such as simultaneously claiming to be
extremely pro-life, extremely pro-choice, but against abortions in the case of rape and incest.
I explicitly focus on pure strategies.
3. Non-strategic voters select their candidate of choice using the proposed voter heuristic. In
the scenario where both candidates oer voters their ideal points, support will be divided
according to a voter contest success function.
4. The winner will be probabilistically selected according to an increasing, twice-continuously
dierentiable function mapping the percentage of voter support to the probability of winning,
5Ecological rationality is dened by Gigerenzer et al. (2000) as \the structure of environments, the structure of
heuristics, and the match between them".
6I use the labels \Democratic" and \Republican" for ease of exposition. No connotations should be inferred.Candidate Campaign Game 7
 : [0;1] 7! [0;1], ()0 > 0. This function incorporates the uncertainty inherent to voter
turnout, the idiosyncrasies of the electoral college, etc.7
Since the function mapping voter support to probability of winning is increasing, I will use the
terms \support" and \votes" interchangeably.
3.0.1 Voter Contest Success Function
To determine each candidate's percentage of voter support when policies overlap, I utilize the
concept of a contest success function as detailed in Hirshleifer (2005) and is common in the rent-
seeking literature.8 In particular, I assume that each candidate, i, with personal aect, i, and























i > 0: The aect potential of candidate i. This variable indicates the ability of the candidate to
express condence, competency, positive emotional appeal, and to garner a sense of trust in
the voters.
m > 0: The mass eect parameter. As m decreases, the less detrimental ambiguity becomes.
Intuitively, D and R can be described as follows. Assume each candidate expresses an identical
level of ambiguity. D
D+R will represent the share of the contested votes won by Candidate D.
Note that if D > R, Candidate D will win more than 50% of the contested votes on strength
of personality. If D = 2 and R = 1, for instance, Candidate D will win 2=3 of the contested votes.
The mass eect parameter, m, can be interpreted as the cost of being more ambiguous than the
other candidate. To illustrate this intuition, assume the two candidates are competing for voters
whose ideologies range from 1 to 7, as is standard in the American National Election Survey and is
7 is included in the model for two reasons. First, it removes a discontinuity in the candidates' best response
functions. In particular, if candidates care only about winning and voter support has a one-to-one mapping with
total votes, then a discontinuity will exist at the ambiguity level that ensures 50% of the vote. This will result in
strategies in which the winning candidate is not concerned with maximizing her support, and the losing candidate
will behave entirely arbitrarily. Neither seems to accurately represent American presidential politics. Second, the
2000 presidential elections in which the more popular candidate lost implies a probabilistic function is a reasonable
assumption.
8For a microfoundational treatment of this specic functional form, please refer to Petranka (2010).8 Candidate Campaign Game
demonstrated in Figure 1(a). In addition, assume these candidates have identical aect potentials
(D = R). Lastly, assume Candidate D has selected an ambiguity of 3. This would be the case,
for instance, if she claimed to be a 2-4 on the ANES scale.9 For values of m ranging from 2 to 5,
Figure 1(b) shows the share of the contested votes candidate R will receive as his level of ambiguity
changes. Note that lower values of m allow Candidate R to be more successful when he is more
ambiguous than Candidate D. Likewise, lower values of m allow candidate D to be more successful
when she is more ambiguous than Candidate R.
(a) ANES Ideological Range (b) Eect of m on Voter Share
Figure 1: Mass Eect Parameter
Note that the general contest success function expressed in Equation 1 displays the following desir-
able properties regarding voter behavior.
 As a candidate's ambiguity increases, his share of the contested votes will decrease.
 As a candidate's aect potential increases, his share of the contested votes will increase.
 The units of the underlying issue space do not aect the shares of contested votes.
 If all candidates display an equal level of ambiguity, the more emotionally appealing candidate
will win a higher share of the contested vote.
 The share of the contested voters sums to 1, and each candidate receives a share of the vote
between 0 and 1.
 The choice between two alternatives is independent of a third candidate who receives no share
of the vote. i.e. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
9This would be the case if she claimed to not be a Strong Democrat, but also was not a Republican. e.g. she
campaigned on the platform of being a moderate Democrat.Candidate Campaign Game 9
Clark and Riis (1998) show that if (  DL;  RC) = ( 1;1), the contest success function must be in
the form of Equation 1 for these properties to hold.
3.0.2 Candidate Objective Functions
I assume each candidate achieves a utility of 1 from winning the election and, as such, maximizes
his expected utility by maximizing his probability of winning.10 For the contest success function
dened above and a given f  DL;  RCg, the expected utility for each candidate in the game repre-
sented in Figure 2 is therefore:




 RC    DL

RL    DL + sD(DC   RL)

(4)
VR(RL) = 1   VD = 1   

1
 RC    DL

RL    DL + sD(DC   RL)

(5)
10Instead of maximizing the probability of winning by maximizing vote share, we could also assume there exist
n voters with iid uniform distributions over [  DL;  RC] whose exact locations are unknown to the candidates. Per
Ledyard (1984), the dierence in probability a voter will vote for Candidate D and the probability a voter will vote
for Candidate R is a good approximation for the probability Candidate D wins the election. If we interpret the
share of contested voter support as the probability a voter in the contested range will vote for a particular candidate,
this approximation can be used. Assuming candidates attempt to maximize their probability of winning under this
scenario and using this approximation results in no fundamental changes.10 Results
4 Results
Given the complete information environment and the simultaneous moves of the candidates, I use
the Nash equilibrium solution concept to determine the optimal strategies. Due to the symmetry
of the problem, I assume w.l.o.g. that D > R.11 All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.




























L =  RC  









where W(y) is the real-valued branch of the Lambert W-function (also called the omega function),
which is the function satisfying W(y)eW(y) = y.13
Proposition 2. For 1 + R
D < m  m, the optimal strategies for the candidates are:
D
C =  RC
R
L =  RC   exp
ln
h






Proposition 3. For 0  m  1 + R
D, the optimal strategies for the candidates are:
D
C =  RC
R
L =  DL
For D = 2;R = 1, Figure 3 graphically shows Propositions 1 through 3 over a range of mass
eect parameters.
For m  m, the above results show one or both candidates select full ambiguity as an optimal
strategy. This appears in contrast to the current American political environment, in which pres-
idential candidates tend to cater to voters ranging from their base to slightly beyond the median
voter (Democrats try to appeal to Independents leaning Republican and vice versa). As such, I
focus the remainder of the paper on scenarios in which m > m. For this range, Proposition 1
directly implies:
11For ease of exposition, the case where D = R is ignored. The closed-form solutions are identical, with m = 2.
It should be clear that the optimal solutions are symmetric, and no region will exist in which only one candidate will
be fully ambiguous.
12Numerically, m is bounded below by 2.
13W(y) is a multi-valued function over the complex reals. However, the real-valued branch of W(y), when restricted
to y 2 <+, is a positive, strictly increasing, concave function. Please refer to Corless et al. (1996) for further details.Results 11
Figure 3: Nash Equilibria
Proposition 4. For m > m, the size of the conict zone, D
C R





 RC    DL
m   1
This proposition is the key nding of the paper. Along with Proposition 1, it tells us that for a
given m > m, while the optimal level of ambiguity might vary from election year to election year,
the number of contested voters will not. Graphically, it indicates that dierent values of D > R
will vertically shift Figure 3, but the interior shape will remain the same. This result will prove
central in explaining recent trends in American presidential politics. Note that Proposition 1 also
implies the candidate more likely to win will be more ambiguous than the losing candidate, a nding
validated by Campbell (1983).
To relate Proposition 4 to recent trends in American presidential politics, it is rst necessary to oer
denitions of political aliation. It should be noted that party labels in America are meaningless
outside the context of the prevailing political parties. Even in the last twenty years, we have seen
the term \Republican" take on a signicantly more morally conservative connotation. I therefore
oer the following denitions:
Independent American Voter: A voter whose ideal ideological stance is not consistently es-
poused by one and only one political party.
Partisan American Voter: A voter whose ideal ideological stance is consistently espoused by12 Results
one and only one political party.
Political Party: A party comprised of partisan voters.
In other words, an Independent American voter is one who cannot count on a specic party to be
the sole party oering their ideal viewpoint. These denitions coincide with the trends found in
Figure 4, which shows a strong relationship between partisanship and the voter's perception that
one party is superior to the other on their most important issue.14
Figure 4: Independent Voters
With these denitions in mind, we return to the model. I assume that American presidential
candidates have a bounded aect potential advantage over each other. This assumption is based
on the inherent \political savvy" required to even be considered a presidential candidate. I model
this assumption by assuming D
R 2 [A;B], where fA;Bg 2 f<2
+jA < Bg. I also assume that neither
party consistently oers more personable candidates. Dening D
max as the most conservative
position a Democratic candidate will adopt, R
min the most liberal position a Republican candidate
will adopt, [  DL;D
max] the voters targeted by Democratic candidates, [R
min;  RC] the voters targeted
by Republican candidates, and I the percentage of Independent voters, I nd:
Proposition 5. For m > m, changes due to specic candidate personalities will not aect ei-
ther party's targeted base, the number of self-proclaimed Independent voters, or the level of party
ambiguity. Analytically,























Proposition 6. For m > m, a decrease in m (corresponding to a decrease in the cost of being
more ambiguous than the other candidate) will result in:
 The Democratic party will target a larger base.
 The Republican party will target a larger base.
 Candidates will become more ambiguous.













Intuitively, as ambiguity becomes less harmful to candidates, they will choose to be more vague in
their campaign platforms. This will have the eect of causing fewer voters to be convinced that
a single party can implement their ideal point. For instance, consider an environment in which
ambiguity is harmful. Assume that each candidate caters to their own base. Democrats would oer
policy platforms that include the ideal points of voters between Strongly Democratic and Indepen-
dent (1-4 on the ANES 1-7 scale). Republicans would oer the opposite policy platforms (4-7).
Only true Independents (a 4 on the ANES scale) would identify themselves as an Independent,
since every other voter type recognizes a single party who identies with their ideal point. As
ambiguity becomes less harmful, the Democratic candidate would oer a more conservative pol-
icy stand, including the ideal points of Independent leaning Republican voters (a 5 on the ANES
scale). Likewise, Republicans would oer a more liberal policy stand, including the ideal points of
Independent leaning Democratic voters (a 3 on the ANES scale). With decreased ambiguity cost,
all voters between 3 and 5 would now identify themselves as Independent, since both parties oer
their ideal point.
Note Proposition 6 also directly implies:
Proposition 7. For m > m, a decrease in m (corresponding to a decrease in the cost of being
more ambiguous than the other candidate) will result in:14 Trends in Modern American Presidential Politics
 The Democratic party, on average, will consist of more liberal voters, resulting in increased
partisanship.



















Propositions 5 through 7 are demonstrated in Figure 5. These results imply that a decrease in
the cost of ambiguity will result in an increased number of independent voters, party partisanship,
and candidate ambiguity. Arguably all three trends have been seen in recent American presidential
elections, with timing coinciding with specic political events.
(a) m=4 (b) m=2.5
Figure 5: Eect of a Decrease in the Mass Eect Parameter, m
5 Trends in Modern American Presidential Politics
Since the late 1960's, it has been well documented by Crotty and Jacobson (1984), Wattenberg
(2000), Luttbeg and Gant (1995), and others that partisanship has had a declining eect on Amer-
ican voting decisions. Figure 6 demonstrates the rise of the self-proclaimed independent voter.15
15Independents are classied as those labeling themselves \Independent Democrat", \Independent Republican",
or \Independent Independent" on the ANES survey. On a 1-7 scale, it is those individuals labeling themselves a 3,
4, or 5. See Figure 1(a) for the full ANES scale.Trends in Modern American Presidential Politics 15
Figure 6: Rise of the Independent American Voter
Despite the increase in independent voters, Groseclose et al. (1999), Jacobson (2000), Stonecash
et al. (2003), and Brewer (2005) have shown that regardless of the measure used, the ideological
distance between the parties has been growing, with the Democrats becoming more liberal and the
Republicans becoming more conservative.
Coinciding with the increase in Independent voters is the common complaint that American pres-
idential candidates are increasingly vague. Through the course of a presidential election, policy
positions are rarely consistently unambiguous, causing Levine (1995) to claim \the major candi-
dates rarely oer a clear choice of detailed, workable policy solutions on issues of importance to
voters".
On the issue of NAFTA, John McCain, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton's websites oer the
following proposals:16
 \The U.S. should engage in multilateral, regional and bilateral eorts to promote free trade,
level the global playing eld and build eective enforcement of global trading rules."
 \Obama believes that NAFTA and its potential were oversold to the American people. Obama
will work with the leaders of Canada and Mexico to x NAFTA so that it works for American
workers. "
 \[Hillary] will also ensure that trade policies work for average Americans. Trade policy must
16www.johnmccain.com, www.barackobama.com, and www.hillaryclinton.com as of 4/29/2008. Note Hillary Clinton
and John McCain did not specically mention NAFTA.16 Trends in Modern American Presidential Politics
raise our standard of living, and they must have strong protections for workers and the
environment"
From these stances, it is extremely dicult to determine the exact measures each candidate will
take on the issue. We seem far removed from the 1964 election when Barry Goldwater made his
ideological position clear by proclaiming in his Republican National Convention acceptance speech,
\Anyone who joins us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those, those who do not care for our cause,
we don't expect to enter our ranks, in any case. And let our Republicanism so focused and so
dedicated not be made fuzzy and futile by unthinking and stupid labels. I would remind you that
extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the
pursuit of justice is no virtue!".17
With the model proposed in this paper, the rise in independent voters, candidate ambiguity, and
party partisanship can all be explained simultaneously with a decrease in the value of the mass eect
parameter, m. Or, put dierently, over the past fty years, ambiguity has become less detrimental
for presidential candidates. Specically, Figure 6 indicates ambiguity must have become signicantly
less detrimental in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and gradually less detrimental from 1980 - 2004.
I argue there is reason to believe this is the case, especially due to two major political phenomena.
5.1 Death of the Party Bosses 1968-1976
In 1968, the Democratic party nominated Hubert Humphrey for their presidential candidate. This
is despite the fact that he had not won (or entered) a single primary. Politics of the day were
dictated by party bosses, \who from the sanctity of the so-called smoke-lled rooms at nominating
conventions handpicked `their' candidate to be the party nominee....Party bosses, through a system
that combined the disposition of jobs with political favors, support, and even protection, controlled
the votes, the party, and thus the selection of all candidates" (Trent and Friedenberg, 1995).
Humphrey's nomination caused such disenfranchisement with Antiwar Democrats that the 1968
convention caused a riot in Chicago. Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee, ended up narrowly
winning the general election. To avoid a recurrence, Democrats enacted party rule changes referred
to as the McGovern-Fraser reforms. These reforms eectively took the convention out of the \back-
rooms" and emphasized general primaries versus closed-room caucuses. Between 1968 and 1976,
the percent of delegates selected via a Democratic primary (versus a caucus) increased from 38%
to 73%.18 In addition, in 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was passed into law,
limiting the amount of private money available to candidates receiving public support. This had
the eect of limiting the inuence of a small number of wealthy donors.
Both changes had substantial eects on the American political landscape. Signicant nancial
contributors could no longer require unambiguous promises from candidates. Party-bosses could
not demand the candidate run on a specic party platform. There was no longer a small group of
17On specic policy issues, Goldwater was equally uncompromising. In a campaign brochure found at http:
//www.4president.org/brochures/goldwater1964brochure.htm, Goldwater clearly states he is for an increase in
State's rights, against the Civil Rights Act of 1964's public accommodations provision, for a decrease in Union
power, and against expansion of government Welfare.
18In an eort to maintain the appearance of openness in the face of the Democratic changes, Republicans also
enacted changes. Between 1968 and 1976, the percent of delegates selected via a Republican primary increased from
34% to 68%.Trends in Modern American Presidential Politics 17
individuals to whom detailed promises must be made. As the role of closed-door caucuses became
less pronounced in the nomination of presidential candidates, ambiguity became less harmful to
individual nominees. Ambiguous messages could be delivered through the course of a campaign
that could not occur in a single national convention during which the elected candidate was chosen
internally.
In terms of the model, this had the eect of lowering the mass eect parameter, m, extremely
quickly. In turn, this caused candidates to espouse more ambiguous campaign stances, increasing
the number of self-proclaimed Independent voters. This downward trend in the caucus system
lasted until the late 1970's, at which point the rise in the number of political primaries leveled
o. This coincides with the period during which the number of Independent voters stabilized. As
shown in Figure 6, since the eect of the campaign reform measures stabilized in 1976, the number
of Independents has remained reasonably steady.
5.2 Rise of the Partisan Media 1980-2008
While the number of Independents in the last three decades has not shown the drastic rise of the
late 1960's, Figure 6 does show a seemingly consistent increase. I argue this eect is in part due to
cable and internet news, and the partisan bias consistent therein.
To explain this eect, note CNN, the rst 24-hour cable news program, was founded in 1980. Since
that time, the number of cable news outlets and internet news sources has grown exponentially, as
well as the partisan slant of the media as a whole.19 I argue this ability to receive biased news has
increased the value of ambiguity.
In particular, biased news outlets allow voters to self-select their information cues. In 2004, for
instance, 52% of regular Fox viewers described themselves as politically conservative, while only
36% of CNN viewers and 33% of nightly network news viewers did the same.20 This corresponds to
the ndings of Groseclose and Milyo (2005), who show Fox News is more conservative than other
news outlets. Using a biased news outlet that lters conicting information allows voters to avoid
the psychological cost of contradictory statements.21 This has the eect of allowing candidates to
be more ambiguous in their campaign platforms, in that there is a reduced risk of voters hearing
contradictory statements.
As an example, when asked in 2003, \Is it your impression that the US has or has not found clear
evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the al Qaeda terrorist organiza-
tion?", a study by the Program on International Policy Attitudes22 found that 67% of Fox News
viewers believed the U.S. had found evidence linking the two. This is the highest of any other
listed news organization, and is in considerable contrast to the 16% of NPR viewers who answered
similarly.
19Please see Goldberg (2003) and Alterman (2003) for details.
20http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=215
21Burke (2007) oers an alternative rationale for using biased news outlets that does not rely on the concept of
psychological cost.
22http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/oct03/IraqMedia_Oct03_rpt.pdf18 Ecacy of the Heuristic
6 Ecacy of the Heuristic
One of the requirements for a heuristic to be ecologically rational is that it performs \almost as
well" as a more complicated decision process. In terms of our model, this implies for voters to be
using the \hear what you want to hear" heuristic, it must perform reasonably well compared to
a fully informed process. To claim a heuristic exists that systematically resulted in the \wrong"
decision would be fundamentally suspect.
To judge the ecacy of the heuristic, it is impossible to use isolated voters. In particular, the as-
sumption of any heuristic implies that voters will never become fully informed, and as such, never
determine what the \right" decision should have been. A voter (at the time their vote is cast)
always views their decision as correct. As such, to determine if the heuristic is valid, I will use an
aggregate performance measure.
Specically, I will assume that winning candidates enact policy stands at the mean of their issue
interval. Voters view their initial vote as \right" if the enacted policy stand is \closer" (in a fully
informed spatial sense) than their estimate of the losing candidate's policy interval, which we also
assume is at the mean of their issue interval.23 In addition, I assume that the share of voters voting
for the Republican candidate are those on the more conservative side of the conict zone (and vice
versa). Call this metric the ecacy metric.
Proposition 8. Using the ecacy metric, for scenarios in which D
R < 20, the percentage of voters
voting \correctly" equals




















































Figure 7 shows this percentage of voters for which the heuristic is eective. Aect potentials are
shown such that a candidate facing another candidate with identical ambiguity will receive any-
where from 25% to 75% of the vote. Mass eect parameters are shown such that equilibrium
conict zones will range from 1/4 to 1/2 of the total possible political ideology. Assuming that
American presidential politics exists within these ranges,24 approximately 95%+ of voters will view
their choice as correct, ex-post.
As the justication for using a fast and frugal heuristic is its tradeo between speed and accuracy,
it useful to examine how the party heuristic, in which voters vote for the candidate promoted by
23As long as the assumed policy skew is identical for each party, the mean assumption is not critical. It is worth
noting that a candidate who enacts policies considerably more extreme than expected will cause a signicantly higher
number of voters to be disappointed with their initial vote.
24Given the requirements necessary to win a party primary, it is reasonable to assume no two presidential candidates
are signicantly dierent in aect potential. Also, modern campaigns show a propensity for \appealing to the
independent voter without alienating your base", implying a moderate level of conict.Multidimensional Issue Space 19
Figure 7: Ecacy of the \Hear What You Want To Hear" Heuristic
their preferred party, compares to the \hear what you want to hear" heuristic. In particular, voters
should not use the more complex \hear what you want to hear" heuristic unless it oers an accuracy
advantage over the party heuristic. Figure 8 shows the ecacy of voters using the \hear what you
want to hear" heuristic versus the party heuristic. Numerically, as m decreases, the greater the
accuracy benet to using the \hear what you want to hear" heuristic. Thus, as the cost of ambiguity
decreases, we should see a movement away from strict party voters.25
7 Multidimensional Issue Space
It is worth noting the eect of a multidimensional issue space on the model. If we assume that
ambiguity in one issue does not aect the share of the contested vote in another issue,26 then we
can view each issue space as a separate game. A candidate's aect potential might vary from issue
to issue, allowing one candidate to be specic on some issues and ambiguous on others. However,
25Two notes are worth mentioning. First, by assuming the share of contested voters who vote for Republicans are
those whose positions are more conservative, I am assuring the highest ecacy level possible for the \hear what you
want to hear" heuristic. If I assume the shares of each type of voter are distributed randomly throughout the conict
zone, then the results are not as clear cut. In particular, a large aect dierential need exist in order for the \hear
what you want to hear" heuristic to clearly surpass the party heuristic. Second, the ecacy of the party heuristic
is based on the best responses of candidates assuming voters are using the \hear what you want to hear" heuristic.
Thus, this analysis should not be viewed as a causal justication for the \hear what you want to hear" heuristic, but
instead be viewed as an argument for its ecological rationality in its current environment.
26For instance, a devote pro-life candidate's share of the pro-life vote will not be aected by an ambiguous stance
on welfare reform.20 Conclusion
(a) m=5 (b) m=3
Figure 8: \Hear What You Want To Hear" vs. Party Heuristic
the best responses in each game will follow the form of Proposition 1.
Note the only signicant change to the unidimensional model is the higher likelihood that voters
will choose not to vote. If, for instance, a candidate oers the voter's ideal point in Issue 1, but
does not in Issue 2, the heuristic will mandate the voter does not vote. This again coincides with
the ndings that individuals avoid making trade-os between cues pointing in opposite directions.
This result also oers an explanation for the highly correlated party stances on highly disparate
issues (pro-social welfare, pro-union, pro-choice, etc.). Because a voter claiming to be pro-choice is
likely to be pro-welfare, the optimal strategy for a Democrat is to oer both issue stances.
Lastly, note that the multidimensional model allows the concept of a voter satiscing strategy. In
particular, because each game is separate, voters choosing to focus on only a few key issues do not
aect any of the results.
8 Conclusion
This paper has applied a voter heuristic to American presidential elections and applied the eco-
nomic theory of conict to help explain recent trends in American presidential politics. The model's
key results are that individual candidate personality does not inuence the trends of Independent
voters, party partisanship, or long-term ambiguity. Instead, only the cost of being ambiguous is
signicant, with lower ambiguity costs related to increases in these trends. I have also made the case
that the primary system, campaign nance reform, and changing media climate have all resulted
in lower ambiguity costs. Lastly, I have shown that the proposed heuristic is ecologically rational.
While the model oers a starting point to understanding candidate and voter behavior, it has not
addressed the rich environment inherent to campaign advertising strategy. I assumed the level ofAppendix 21
aect potential is xed for each candidate, but this is an obvious simplication, given the eec-
tiveness of negative campaigning, image consultants, etc. Further, I have not explored how the
primary campaign game aects the general election. Exploring this subgame would likely oer
further insight into optimal presidential campaign strategies. In particular, examining the tradeo
between more extreme and more personable candidates would likely prove valuable.
9 Appendixy
I will solve for the Nash equilibrium using the necessary rst order conditions for an interior solution.
I will then verify the solution is, in fact, a maximum using the second order conditions. Lastly, for
m > m, I will conrm the constraints DC 2 [  DL;  RC] and RL 2 [  DL;  RC] are not violated.
9.0.1 First Order Conditions
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:
With Candidate R selecting his most liberal campaign position, R
L, the necessary condition for an
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D and rearranging,
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C    DL)
= 0: (7)
yI use considerable algebraic simplication throughout the Appendix. To view additional intermediate algebraic
steps, please refer to www.unc.edu/~petranka/PetrankaCTV_Extended.pdf22 Appendix
With Candidate D selecting her most conservative campaign position, D
C, the necessary condition
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Setting   D
R and simplifying,
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Setting   (  RC   R
L) and    (D
C    DL), Eqn. (9) can be written
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Combined, Eqns. (10) and (12) tell usAppendix 23
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which, after recognizing  = 1, implies
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or, after further simpli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Substituting for   from Eqn. (13) and simplifying,
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Multiplying both sides by ,

 +











which, after taking the natural log of both sides, implies,
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Changing  back to (  RC   R
L) and   back to (D
C    DL),24 Appendix
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Eqns. (13) and (14) imply
D
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9.0.2 Second Order Conditions
With Candidate R again selecting his most liberal campaign position, R
L, a sucient condition for
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In addition, Proposition 2 implies
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verifying we have solved for the Nash Equilibrium if the constraints are not violated.
9.0.3 Requirements to Avoid Constraint Violation
W.L.O.G. assume R > D, making R
L >  DL the relevant constraint. We will assume R
L >  DL,
and determine the required conditions on m, D, and R. All variables should be assumed to be
at the optimum.
R
L >  DL and Eqn. (14) imply
 DL <  RC  
























< (m   1)ln[m   1]: (18)
Setting y  ln[ R



















where W(y) is the Lambert W-function (also called the omega function), which is dened as the
inverse function of f(W) = WeW.
Changing y back to ln[ R
D] and x back to (m   1) in Eqn. (19),
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 + 1 when R > D:
Symmetrically,
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 + 1 when D > R:
W.L.O.G., assume D > R. Dening   D
R, for 1 + 1
 < m  m, the above analysis shows
a fully interior solution does not exist. To solve for the Nash equilibrium, I will instead assume
Candidate D is fully ambiguous, show Candidate R will select an interior solution, then verify Can-
didate D's best response to Candidate R is, in fact, full ambiguity.
Step 1: Assume D

C =  RC and D > R. Find candidate R's optimal strategy, R

L, assuming
an interior solution.Appendix 27
Eqn. (9), with the assumption that D
C =  RC, implies at an interior optimum for candidate R,
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or, simplied,
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Further simplication and taking the natural log of both sides tells us
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@DC > 0, implying DC =  RC is an optimum for candidate D.
Equations (6) and (20) imply @VD
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Recognizing  = D
R, this further reduces to
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Using the same techniques as in Section (9.0.3), note when D > R, m < m if and only if
ln[] > (m   1)ln[m   1];
which implies
 > (m   1)m 1:
Multiplying both sides by (m   1), raising each side to the 1








Combining Eqns. (22) and (21), we nd @VD
@DC (  RC) > 0, implying DC =  RC is, in fact, candidate
D's best response when candidate R is playing R
L.
Step 3: Determine the requirement on m that ensures RL = R

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To ensure the constraints are not violated, we need
 DL  R
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Raising both sides to the  m power (which reverses the inequality) and rearranging, we need




9.1 Proof of Proposition 3
W.L.O.G., assume D > R. Again dening   D
R, for m < 1 + 1
 the above analysis shows
neither candidate will have an interior solution. To show both Candidates will be fully ambiguous,
I will instead assume Candidate D is fully ambiguous, show Candidate R's best response to Can-
didate D is full ambiguity, then verify Candidate D's best response to Candidate R is, in fact, full
ambiguity.
Step 1: When DC =  RC, show
@VR
@RL < 0, implying RL =  DL is an optimum for candidate R.
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: (24)
Note that when 0 < m < 1 + 1

  RC    DL
 RC   RL
m
 1 > (m   1);
which implies
 
  RC    DL
 RC   RL
m
+ (m   1) < 0: (25)
Combining Eqns. (24) and (25) we nd @VR
@RL < 0, implying RL =  DL is Candidate R's best response
when Candidate D is playing  RC and 0 < m < 1 + 1
.
Step 2: When RL =  DL, show
@VD
@DC > 0, implying DC =  RC is an optimum for Candidate D.
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Note that since DC   DL
 RC   DL  1, when 0 < m < 1 + 1
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which, along with Eqns. (27) and (26), tell us @VD
@DC > 0, implying DC =  RC is, in fact, candidate
D's best response when candidate R is playing  DL and 0 < m < 1 + 1
.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Within the aective potential bounds of [A;B], note that Eqns. (14) and (15) imply the Democratic
and Republican parties will, at most, cater to voters in the ranges:





















Lmin   RC  















 RC    DL
:
















@R = 0, @I
@D = 0, and
@I
@R = 0. Intuitively, individual candidates do not aect a voter's stated ideology. Instead, only
the recognized party bounds are critical. A single Democratic candidate running on a highly con-
servative platform would not systematically make Republicans declare themselves Democratic.Appendix 31
9.3 Proof of Proposition 6





















































The rst term in the above equation is negative. The second term is also negative, since A < B
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;
which, using Eqns. (28) and (29), is less than 0.
9.4 Derivation of Figure 6
W.L.O.G., assume D > R. In this scenario, there are two classes of problem as demonstrated in
Figure 9:
9.4.1 Case 1: Indierent Voter (IV) < R

L
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(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
Figure 9: Possible Interior Nash Equilibrium Outcomes
Simplied, this implies
2R
L >  DL + (D
C   R
L) +  RC;
which, along with Proposition 2, requires
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L >  DL +  RC +
 RC    DL
m   1
:
Combined with Eqn. (14), this tells us
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Figure 10 represents this inequality for values of m for which the equilibrium solutions would range
from full ambiguity to 5% issue overlap, a seemingly reasonable range for American presidential
politics. As shown, in order for Case 1 to occur, the aect potential ratio must exceed 20, implying
that for an identical level of ambiguity, one candidate would win 95%+ of the contested votes.Appendix 33
Figure 10: Case 1 parameter requirements
9.4.2 Case 2: Indierent Voter (IV) >= R

L
Having established Case 1 does not occur if D
R < 20, I focus on Case 2. Note the assumption that
D > R ensures IV < D
C, allowing us to focus on the scenario shown in Figure 9(b). Again, all
variables should be assumed to be at the optimal interior values, as determined in Proposition 1.
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Note Eqn. (15) implies
D
















and Eqn. (14) implies
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Together, Eqns. (33) and (34) tell us
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Plugging Eqn. (35) into Eqn. (32) and simplifying,
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. Plugging Proposition 4 into Eqn. 36 and simplifying,
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Plugging Eqn. (14) into Eqn. (37) and simplifying,
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which, after simplication, implies


















































which can be graphed as a function of mass eect parameter, m, and the aect potential ratio D
R.REFERENCES 35
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